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Warning Signs: 2021 Update

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Executive Summary

Most of Connecticut's towns and cities face significant unfunded liabilities from pension and retiree healthcare benefits promised to current and former employees. In fact, these liabilities have together grown more than \$5 billion in just four years and are likely to climb even higher.

As a group, municipalities owe more money for benefits promised to current and former employees than they do for their own infrastructure. Many of these unfunded liabilities may ultimately prove to be even larger than current estimates as more realistic actuarial assumptions are applied.

The fiscal health of any of the state's 169 municipalities risks becoming a concern for all residents. This was most recently demonstrated by the state's 2018 financial rescue of Hartford, which saddled state taxpayers with over a half-billion dollars in payments over 20 years.

To measure the fiscal health of every town and city, Yankee Institute in 2018 worked with municipal finance expert Marc Joffe of the Reason Foundation. Joffe's updated analysis, using fiscal 2020 data, showed that the town of Stratford, the city of Bridgeport, and town of Hamden are the state's most fiscally stressed municipalities.

The General Assembly should reduce the uncertainty around unfunded liabilities by requiring municipalities to use actuarial assumptions equal to or more conservative than the state's main pension fund and to improve public disclosure. Towns and cities, meanwhile, need more flexibility to limit future liabilities by diverting new employees to defined-contribution retirement plans that are popular in the private sector.

Introduction: Cloudy Promises

Connecticut's state and local taxes are noteworthy on two levels. First, because they're among the country's highest by any practical measure. And second, because much of what is collected each year gets spent paying off debt for services that were delivered long before.

Governments typically incur debt to finance a lasting asset, such as a water pipe or a highway bridge. Projects are financed with bonds that spread repayment over much or all the asset's lifespan. People are getting use from it for as long as they are paying for it.

But for decades, both Connecticut's state government and its towns and cities have been accumulating another form of debt that leaves future generations holding nothing but an invoice. Many of today's taxpayers are paying for snow that was plowed, classes that were taught, and shifts that were worked long before they were born.

That's because public employers promised workers what amounts to a lifetime of benefits—namely defined-benefit pensions and retiree healthcare coverage—without setting aside adequate funds to pay for them. An employee who begins working for a municipality today could conceivably remain on that municipality's health insurance plan until the end of the century.

The practice of deferring personnel expenses has been exacerbated by Connecticut's widespread use of public-sector collective bargaining, where elected officials make binding promises to labor unions regarding pay and benefits, including pensions and retiree healthcare. This structure gives officials an incentive to shift costs to the

future in order to limit the extent to which taxes must rise in the near-term.

What's more, Connecticut's legal framework forces employers to negotiate with unions before changes can be made to the retiree health benefits or pensions of workers who haven't yet been hired.

Recent improvements in government accounting standards have made it clear that state and local governments weren't paying the full cost of the services they were delivering—and now today's taxpayers must make up the difference.

In city after city, town after town, and in state government itself, the same situation has played out: catching up on these obligations means a larger portion of tax dollars must go toward these legacy costs rather than current needs, which puts them under fiscal stress.

Twenty-four cents of every dollar budgeted by Connecticut in its just-ended 2021 fiscal year (about \$5.4 billion) went toward debt service and benefits for retired state employees, including substantial catch-up payments for underfunded pensions.ⁱ Another \$1.6 billion was separately directed to state pension funds under rules controlling volatile income tax revenues.ⁱⁱ

Connecticut's unfunded liabilities for pensions and retiree healthcare mushroomed over the course of a decade from \$6.7 billion in 2010 to \$62.8 billion, or \$17,433 per resident, in 2020. The state is paying for healthcare coverage for more retirees or their beneficiaries (77,000) than active employees (48,000).

Everyone's Problem

The fiscal health of each of Connecticut's municipalities, meanwhile, is a matter of statewide concern because state taxpayers have repeatedly picked up the tab when a local government faces insolvency.

Most notably, Governor Dannel Malloy in 2018 announced state taxpayers would pick up debt service payments totaling \$754 million for the city of Hartford over the next 20 years.ⁱⁱⁱ

"There is no two years of help that would straighten Hartford out," Malloy said at the time.^{iv} The mayors of Bridgeport and New Haven meanwhile criticized the

"Hartford bailout" and the extent to which state officials were "rewarding the past practices of other cities that put them on the edge of financial collapse."^v

In addition to \$20 million in special aid received by the state capital, Connecticut since 2018 has sent more than \$6 million to the city of West Haven and \$500,000 to the town of Sprague to help them stave off insolvency.^{vi}

Yet many, if not most, municipalities are continuing the very practices that put them under fiscal stress in the first place.

Pensions

Defined-benefit retirement plans, which guarantee employees continual payments in retirement, are increasingly rare in the private sector. Just 25 percent of all U.S. workers had access to such plans in 2020, down from 31 percent in 2010.^{vii}

About three-quarters of Connecticut municipalities, on the other hand, operate at least one defined-benefit pension plan in which employees have been promised specific payments in retirement based on their years of service and final average salary rather than on the amount of money set aside to cover the benefit.^{viii}

Contributions from employers and employees fund investments which are meant to cover future pension payments. But taxpayers must ultimately guarantee these investments regardless of market performance.

Other factors muddy forecasting around pensions. Plans must make actuarial assumptions about how long retirees and their beneficiaries will live. And if plans give retirees cost of living adjustments based on inflation, as many

Connecticut public pension plans do, administrators must forecast that as well.

Each local pension plan has its own rules about how employees contribute, when they vest, how benefits are calculated, and how investment returns and obligations are forecast.

Pensions were traditionally financed using low-risk, low-yield investments, such as bonds. But the combined pressure to maintain promised future benefits and minimize taxpayer contributions pushes funds to seek riskier investments.

The town of Fairfield, seeking big returns, directed about \$15 million in pension funds to the Ponzi scheme controlled by financier Bernie Madoff.^{ix}

In a similar vein, towns and cities have sometimes issued pension obligation bonds and placed the proceeds in their pension funds, essentially betting that their investments will get a better return than the interest costs.

Former New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine, an investment banker, described the practice as “the dumbest idea I ever heard.”

In recent decades, Bridgeport, Stratford, Hamden, Naugatuck, New Britain, Waterbury, and West Haven have issued such bonds. Tempted by low interest rates, West Hartford joined the list in June 2021 when it sold more than \$324 million in bonds, and Norwich is considering the same.^x Governor M. Jodi Rell herself tried her hand at this, persuading the General Assembly to what amounted to an ill-timed \$2 billion infusion into the state Teachers’ Retirement System just as the global financial crisis was causing a market meltdown.

Recognizing how much risk pensions place on taxpayers, several municipalities in recent years have stopped retirements to their new hires and instead moved them to defined-contribution 401(k)-style plans. The town of Berlin was among the first to move away from offering defined-benefit pensions, and by 1988 was placing all new hires in a defined-contribution plan.^{xi} More than three decades later, the town’s per-capita pension debt is just \$343, a fraction of neighboring Southington (\$1,245), Newington (\$1,817), and Meriden (\$2,767).

Retiree Healthcare (OPEB)

Liabilities for retiree healthcare are reported by public employers as “other post-employment benefits,” or OPEB.

OPEB costs are more difficult to predict than pensions because employers generally promise to cover all or part of a health insurance premium.

Forecasting that cost involves assumptions about how much health care costs will rise in the future, in addition to estimates about how investments will grow and how long retirees will live. Medical care costs, measured as a component of the Consumer Price Index, doubled between 2000 and 2020.^{xii}

Unlike pensions, towns and cities have generally financed their retiree healthcare obligations as a pay-as-you-go

basis, setting aside little or nothing when employees are working and instead planning to pay for their coverage in retirement long after they have left.

Just seven—Branford, Canton, Litchfield, Norwalk, Weston, Wilton, and Windsor Locks—reported having saved enough to cover at least 75 percent of future anticipated costs.

Westport officials in 2011 discovered that consultants had miscalculated the town’s ostensibly fully funded retiree healthcare obligations. Instead, a subsequent analysis revealed, taxpayers were on the hook for close to \$120 million in benefits (assuming a conservative discount rate).^{xiii}

Deeper in the Red

A review of local government financial statements shows the debt picture has worsened since fiscal 2016, the focus of Yankee Institute’s last review.

- Connecticut’s total municipal long-term debt—including unfunded pension and OPEB liabilities—rose from \$22.4 billion to \$27.5 billion. Nearly all that increase was legacy personnel costs: total unfunded OPEB liabilities rose from \$6.6 billion to \$9.2 billion, and unfunded pension liabilities rose from \$4.7 billion to \$6.3 billion.
- For Connecticut’s three largest cities—Bridgeport, Stamford, and New Haven—total long-term liabilities swelled from \$4.1 billion to \$6.4 billion.

- Two cities—Bridgeport and Waterbury—each face unfunded OPEB liabilities over \$1 billion.
- The town of Hamden has more than \$20,000 in debt per capita, the highest level in the state. On the other hand, 27 towns report less than \$1,000 in debt per capita.
- The city of New Haven reports the highest pension debt per capita at \$6,392.
- The borough (town) of Naugatuck has the state’s highest unfunded OPEB liabilities per capita at \$14,994—while 25 municipalities indicated they do not provide retiree healthcare in the first place.

The Fiscal Health Scores

In 2018, Yankee Institute worked with municipal finance expert Marc Joffe of the Reason Foundation to measure the fiscal health of Connecticut towns and cities.


The analysis, which identified the New Haven suburb of Hamden as the state’s most fiscally stressed municipality, proved prescient. In subsequent years, the town saw its bond rating downgraded and ultimately experienced a negative fund balance as legacy costs exploded.^{xiv}

Joffe’s formula has been updated to reflect the latest developments in municipal finance and applied to Connecticut municipalities using their fiscal 2020 financial statements (see methodology notes).

The fiscal health of each Connecticut local government was measured using five criteria:

- Its unrestricted net position compared to FY20 expenditures (20 points)
- Its total long-term liabilities compared to FY20 revenue (30 points)
- Its general fund balance compared to FY20 general fund expenditures (30 points)
- How home prices have changed in the municipality (10 points)
- How the region’s employment level changed between June 2019 and June 2021 (10 points)

Fiscal Health Scores – Connecticut Towns & Cities



The scores range from 12 to 84 (table 1), and a score below 50 is associated with fiscal distress.

The three most-stressed municipalities—Stratford, Bridgeport, and Hamden— are each profiled later in this report.

Connecticut's 10 most-stressed municipalities are a diverse mix, ranging from the town of Seymour (population: 16,748) to Bridgeport (population: 148,654), its most populous city. Their average home price in June 2020 ranged from \$137,703 in Waterbury to \$312,423 in Milford.

Table 1

Fiscal Health Scores - Connecticut Towns & Cities

TOWN / CITY	FISCAL HEALTH SCORE	TOWN / CITY	FISCAL HEALTH SCORE	TOWN / CITY	FISCAL HEALTH SCORE
Stratford	12	Sprague	35	Wethersfield	45
Bridgeport	13	Danbury	35	Thomaston	45
Hamden	14	Ansonia	37	Middletown	45
New Haven	16	Rocky Hill	37	North Stonington	46
Waterbury	17	Torrington	38	Bloomfield	48
Seymour	21	Fairfield	38	Norwalk	48
West Haven	22	Guilford	40	Waterford	48
East Haven	24	Shelton	42	Woodbridge	48
Milford	25	New London	42	Brookfield	49
Naugatuck	26	Norwich	42	Stafford	49
Hartford	26	Ledyard	42	Windham	49
West Hartford	27	Cheshire	42	Middlebury	49
Manchester	27	East Hampton	42	Old Saybrook	50
Stamford	27	Wolcott	42	Bozrah	50
North Haven	30	Plymouth	43	Ellington	50
New Britain	31	Farmington	43	Ridgefield	50
East Hartford	31	Brooklyn	44	Southington	50
Watertown	33	Trumbull	44	Westport	51
Meriden	34	East Lyme	44	Newtown	51
Derby	34	Greenwich	44	Pomfret	51

Table 1**Fiscal Health Scores - Connecticut Towns & Cities**

TOWN / CITY	FISCAL HEALTH SCORE	TOWN / CITY	FISCAL HEALTH SCORE	TOWN / CITY	FISCAL HEALTH SCORE
Thompson	51	Voluntown	57	Litchfield	61
Avon	52	Glastonbury	58	Granby	61
Clinton	52	Colchester	58	Barkhamsted	61
Prospect	53	Darien	58	South Windsor	62
Monroe	53	Ashford	58	Newington	62
Windsor	54	Wilton	58	Tolland	62
Coventry	54	Berlin	59	Canaan	62
Orange	54	Enfield	59	Somers	62
Griswold	55	Plainville	59	Essex	63
Portland	55	North Branford	59	Canton	63
Wallingford	55	Deep River	59	New Hartford	63
Oxford	55	Simsbury	60	Montville	63
Redding	55	Hartland	60	Hebron	63
Suffield	56	Woodbury	60	East Haddam	63
Mansfield	56	New Canaan	60	Canterbury	63
Vernon	56	Madison	60	Lisbon	63
Scotland	56	Union	60	Bolton	63
Weston	57	Bristol	61	Willington	63
Groton	57	Salisbury	61	Plainfield	64
Stonington	57	Bethel	61	Harwinton	64

Table 1

Fiscal Health Scores - Connecticut Towns & Cities

TOWN / CITY	FISCAL HEALTH SCORE	TOWN / CITY	FISCAL HEALTH SCORE	TOWN / CITY	FISCAL HEALTH SCORE
Franklin	64	Durham	68	Killingworth	74
Hampton	64	Lebanon	68	Old Lyme	74
Beacon Falls	65	Southbury	69	Middlefield	75
East Granby	65	Andover	69	Chester	75
Woodstock	65	Chaplin	69	Norfolk	75
New Fairfield	65	Marlborough	69	Branford	76
Haddam	65	Lyme	69	Bethany	78
Burlington	65	Cromwell	70	Roxbury	78
Easton	65	Kent	72	Salem	79
Winchester	66	Windsor Locks	72	Colebrook	79
Bethlehem	66	Westbrook	72	North Canaan	81
Putnam	66	Sharon	72	Bridgewater	82
Goshen	66	Columbia	73	Cornwall	82
Preston	67	East Windsor	73	Washington	82
New Milford	67	Eastford	74	Warren	84
Morris	68	Sherman	74		
Sterling	68	Killingly	74		

But they face similar problems: low fund balances and large liabilities compared to their annual revenues and expenses. In nine of the ten lowest-scoring towns and cities, unfunded liabilities for retiree healthcare exceed unfunded pension costs.

In fact, all 10 benefited from rising home values between 2019 and 2020, without which they would otherwise face even greater fiscal stress.

On the other end of the scale, the highest-scoring municipality was the Litchfield County town of Warren (population: 1,351) with a score of 84. The town has no OPEB liability (funded or unfunded) and years ago stopped enrolling employees in its pension plan. Warren also ended FY2020 with the state’s highest general fund balance compared to general fund expenditures (almost 48 percent).











The four other towns that scored 80 or above were all smaller towns in Litchfield County: Washington, Cornwall, Bridgewater, and North Canaan. All four, like Warren, had strong fund balances and reported no OPEB liabilities.

The state’s 25 highest-scoring municipalities, with two exceptions (Branford and Killingly), had populations under 10,000.

Smaller municipalities tended to have higher scores, indicating less stress: the largest third of towns and cities averaged 43, the middle third averaged 56, and the smallest third averaged 66.

But size doesn’t tell the full story. Bristol, the state’s 14th-largest municipality, earned a 61. Years of steady contributions left the city with no unfunded pension liability under its current assumptions, so much so that the city did not have to make a pension contribution in 2020.

Norwalk, the state’s sixth-most populous municipality, earned a 48, meaning it faces much less fiscal stress than the state’s largest cities (table 1). On a per-capita basis, Norwalk’s pension, retiree healthcare, and overall long-term debt are all lower than Connecticut’s other large cities. In 2012, Norwalk began enrolling certain new hires in a defined-contribution savings plan instead of defined-benefit pension.^{xv} Danbury made a similar change around the same time.^{xvi}

CT'S LARGEST MUNICIPALITIES (FISCAL SCORES)		
Bridgeport	13	
Stamford	27	
New Haven	16	
Hartford	26	
Waterbury	17	
Norwalk	48	
Danbury	35	
New Britain	31	
West Hartford	27	
Greenwich	44	

The scores, which used fiscal 2020 data, do not reflect the deluge of federal aid steered to local governments in response to the novel coronavirus pandemic. The infusion has temporarily buoyed government balance sheets—and concealed growing gaps between municipalities’ long-term liabilities and their ability to pay.

#1: Stratford (Score: 12)

The town of Stratford's story captures many facets of Connecticut's experience over the past century. The town at the mouth of the Housatonic River experienced explosive growth before and after World War II, with the population nearly quadrupling between 1920 and 1960. Many residents were employed by a pair of defense manufacturers, Sikorsky Aircraft and a U.S. Army engine plant later operated by Textron. But the end of the Cold War, particularly the 1995 closure of the engine plant, hit the local economy hard. The town's population has been nearly flat since the early 1970s.

Today, Stratford faces more fiscal stress than any other Connecticut town or city.

The town's debt had topped three-quarters of a billion dollars by the end of fiscal 2020, and Stratford was one of just nine towns and cities whose total debt exceeds 200 percent of annual revenues. It also had one of the lowest general fund balances. Statewide fund balances averaged more than 21 percent of expenditures, but Stratford's was less than 3 percent.

Stratford's experience is a warning to every other municipality about the lasting effects of running up unfunded liabilities because much of the town's debt burden persists almost a decade after, as former Mayor John A. Harkins put it, being "officially out of the pension business."^{xvii}

The town began diverting new employees to defined-contribution retirement plans in 1999 and stopped enrolling new employees in pensions altogether in 2012.

But Stratford's finances remain strained. The town was at the cutting edge of questionable financial practices. In 1998, despite a lack of explicit permission from the General Assembly, town officials issued \$95 million in bonds without explicit legal authorization to boost their pension fund—a wager that pension investments would exceed the cost of borrowing. The town doubled down in 2013, borrowing another \$163 million.

Despite this, the plan today is only 78.5 percent funded.^{xviii}

#2: Bridgeport (Score: 13)

The city of Bridgeport, Stratford's western neighbor, is Connecticut's most populous municipality with almost 149,000 residents. The city's population peaked in the 1950 census and declined in each of the next five decades, only recently posting modest growth.

Bridgeport is no stranger to fiscal trouble. The General Assembly in 1988 established its first-ever state control board to address the Park City's swelling operating deficits.^{xix} When it tried three years later to increase property taxes by 18 percent, Mayor Mary C. Moran instead had the city file Chapter 9 bankruptcy "to adjust

its debts, and specifically to modify certain onerous and economically burdensome contracts."^{xx} Bridgeport's petition was rejected on the basis that the city wasn't yet insolvent.^{xxi}

The city, along with Waterbury, are the only two municipalities with (acknowledged) OPEB liabilities over \$1 billion.

Bridgeport assumes a higher rate of return on its pension investments (7 percent) than Stratford's 6.75.

#3: Hamden (Score: 14)

How did the northern suburb of New Haven come to have the most debt per capita of any town or city?

For starters, by doing nothing: in at least two of the prior twenty years, town officials made no contribution whatsoever toward the pension plan, and in other years made only token payments.^{xxii}

In 2013, officials warned the plan was five years away from running out of money.^{xxiii} Today, despite issuing \$125 million in bonds in 2015 to backfill the pension fund, almost 10 cents of every dollar in revenue must go toward pensions to cover new and existing obligations. Town officials did not make the entire necessary payment in 2020, when the town was experiencing a negative fund balance.

Table 2

Unfunded Pension Debt Per Capita

TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED PENSION DEBT PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED PENSION DEBT PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED PENSION DEBT PER CAPITA
New Haven	\$ 6,392	Newington	\$ 1,817	Windsor Locks	\$ 1,301
Hamden	\$ 5,474	Bloomfield	\$ 1,814	Stratford	\$ 1,300
East Hartford	\$ 4,936	Danbury	\$ 1,798	Plymouth	\$ 1,292
West Hartford	\$ 4,934	Manchester	\$ 1,762	Southington	\$ 1,245
Hartford	\$ 4,440	Milford	\$ 1,761	Clinton	\$ 1,226
Norwich	\$ 3,292	Wallingford	\$ 1,757	Redding	\$ 1,225
Bridgeport	\$ 2,819	Fairfield	\$ 1,727	Portland	\$ 1,178
Meriden	\$ 2,767	Farmington	\$ 1,683	Ansonia	\$ 1,092
Greenwich	\$ 2,453	Waterford	\$ 1,613	Seymour	\$ 1,087
New Britain	\$ 2,449	Orange	\$ 1,465	North Branford	\$ 1,067
Waterbury	\$ 2,318	Norwalk	\$ 1,447	East Hampton	\$ 1,041
Glastonbury	\$ 2,161	Branford	\$ 1,420	Simsbury	\$ 984
New London	\$ 2,077	Naugatuck	\$ 1,409	Madison	\$ 967
Old Saybrook	\$ 2,037	Torrington	\$ 1,396	Stafford	\$ 965
Westport	\$ 1,990	Avon	\$ 1,389	Guilford	\$ 963
Cheshire	\$ 1,962	Woodbridge	\$ 1,387	Montville	\$ 943
Stamford	\$ 1,912	Wethersfield	\$ 1,363	West Haven	\$ 943
Vernon	\$ 1,904	East Haven	\$ 1,359	Oxford	\$ 868
Weston	\$ 1,880	North Haven	\$ 1,333	Winchester	\$ 865
Trumbull	\$ 1,865	Windsor	\$ 1,324	Bethlehem	\$ 838

Table 2

Unfunded Pension Debt Per Capita

TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED PENSION DEBT PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED PENSION DEBT PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED PENSION DEBT PER CAPITA
Easton	\$ 832	Monroe	\$ 550	Woodstock	\$ 288
Griswold	\$ 802	Coventry	\$ 528	Shelton	\$ 287
Wolcott	\$ 786	Woodbury	\$ 528	New Fairfield	\$ 276
Suffield	\$ 765	Andover	\$ 481	Preston	\$ 275
Stonington	\$ 757	Darien	\$ 466	Wilton	\$ 271
Derby	\$ 724	Litchfield	\$ 447	Morris	\$ 268
Watertown	\$ 705	Plainville	\$ 430	Lebanon	\$ 238
Bethel	\$ 705	Deep River	\$ 425	Lisbon	\$ 224
Bozrah	\$ 686	Thomaston	\$ 417	Killingworth	\$ 203
East Windsor	\$ 678	Brooklyn	\$ 407	Enfield	\$ 189
Mansfield	\$ 673	Southbury	\$ 348	New Hartford	\$ 186
Cromwell	\$ 654	Granby	\$ 348	Middlefield	\$ 184
Groton	\$ 650	Berlin	\$ 343	Ridgefield	\$ 183
Middlebury	\$ 632	Windham	\$ 340	Chester	\$ 178
Canton	\$ 608	Ledyard	\$ 336	Thompson	\$ 166
South Windsor	\$ 606	Essex	\$ 328	Durham	\$ 148
Beacon Falls	\$ 582	Rocky Hill	\$ 308	Haddam	\$ 130
Ellington	\$ 571	East Lyme	\$ 307	Canterbury	\$ 121
New Milford	\$ 567	Warren	\$ 306	Bethany	\$ 98
Newtown	\$ 551	Plainfield	\$ 299	Washington	\$ 93

Table 2

Unfunded Pension Debt Per Capita

TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED PENSION DEBT PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED PENSION DEBT PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED PENSION DEBT PER CAPITA
Somers	\$ 88	Chaplin	\$ 0	North Canaan	\$ 0
Prospect	\$ 85	Colebrook	\$ 0	North Stonington	\$ 0
Salisbury	\$ 84	Columbia	\$ 0	Old Lyme	\$ 0
Harwinton	\$ 84	Cornwall	\$ 0	Pomfret	\$ 0
East Haddam	\$ 81	East Granby	\$ 0	Putnam	\$ 0
Westbrook	\$ 73	Eastford	\$ 0	Roxbury	\$ 0
Burlington	\$ 47	Franklin	\$ 0	Salem	\$ 0
Colchester	\$ 40	Hampton	\$ 0	Scotland	\$ 0
Goshen	\$ 22	Hartland	\$ 0	Sharon	\$ 0
Willington	\$ 20	Hebron	\$ 0	Sherman	\$ 0
Ashford	\$ 0	Kent	\$ 0	Sprague	\$ 0
Barkhamsted	\$ 0	Killingly	\$ 0	Sterling	\$ 0
Bolton	\$ 0	Lyme	\$ 0	Tolland	\$ 0
Bridgewater	\$ 0	Marlborough	\$ 0	Union	\$ 0
Bristol	\$ 0	Middletown	\$ 0	Voluntown	\$ 0
Brookfield	\$ 0	New Canaan	\$ 0		
Canaan	\$ 0	Norfolk	\$ 0		

Table 3**Unfunded OPEB Liability Per Capita**

TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED OPEB LIABILITY PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED OPEB LIABILITY PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED OPEB LIABILITY PER CAPITA
Naugatuck	\$ 14,994	Danbury	\$ 2,819	Old Saybrook	\$ 1,107
Waterbury	\$ 10,534	East Hartford	\$ 2,756	Wethersfield	\$ 1,053
Hamden	\$ 10,252	Derby	\$ 2,438	Bristol	\$ 1,053
Milford	\$ 7,874	Pomfret	\$ 2,216	Ridgefield	\$ 1,044
Bridgeport	\$ 7,235	Stamford	\$ 2,114	Meriden	\$ 1,042
Middletown	\$ 6,706	Windsor	\$ 1,980	Cheshire	\$ 1,041
New Haven	\$ 6,125	Farmington	\$ 1,974	Wallingford	\$ 990
Stratford	\$ 6,098	Fairfield	\$ 1,844	Bethel	\$ 958
West Haven	\$ 6,074	Wolcott	\$ 1,825	New Britain	\$ 937
Manchester	\$ 5,949	Ansonia	\$ 1,746	Groton	\$ 919
Bloomfield	\$ 4,061	Westport	\$ 1,650	Norwich	\$ 916
Torrington	\$ 3,960	Guilford	\$ 1,632	Enfield	\$ 898
Watertown	\$ 3,905	Woodbridge	\$ 1,632	Waterford	\$ 884
East Haven	\$ 3,837	Madison	\$ 1,591	Ledyard	\$ 828
North Haven	\$ 3,636	Avon	\$ 1,484	Granby	\$ 822
Hartford	\$ 3,449	Plymouth	\$ 1,450	Woodbury	\$ 800
Seymour	\$ 3,428	Middlebury	\$ 1,182	Trumbull	\$ 796
West Hartford	\$ 3,329	New London	\$ 1,138	Monroe	\$ 767
Thomaston	\$ 2,920	Rocky Hill	\$ 1,127	New Milford	\$ 731
Orange	\$ 2,890	Southington	\$ 1,123	Westbrook	\$ 723

Table 3**Unfunded OPEB Liability Per Capita**

TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED OPEB LIABILITY PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED OPEB LIABILITY PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED OPEB LIABILITY PER CAPITA
Clinton	\$ 722	Killingly	\$ 399	Prospect	\$ 267
Brookfield	\$ 691	Lisbon	\$ 390	Oxford	\$ 251
Plainville	\$ 668	Willington	\$ 385	Canterbury	\$ 243
Coventry	\$ 648	Easton	\$ 369	Branford	\$ 240
North Stonington	\$ 589	Bolton	\$ 368	Bethany	\$ 219
Colchester	\$ 560	South Windsor	\$ 350	Bozrah	\$ 210
Plainfield	\$ 557	Essex	\$ 349	Somers	\$ 196
East Lyme	\$ 507	East Hampton	\$ 341	Newtown	\$ 191
Redding	\$ 447	Simsbury	\$ 340	Ashford	\$ 188
Windham	\$ 447	Suffield	\$ 337	Cromwell	\$ 183
Berlin	\$ 442	Franklin	\$ 332	Sterling	\$ 180
Lebanon	\$ 426	Hampton	\$ 327	Colebrook	\$ 176
Portland	\$ 416	Stafford	\$ 324	Darien	\$ 171
Greenwich	\$ 414	Norwalk	\$ 322	Stonington	\$ 169
Newington	\$ 411	Thompson	\$ 321	Brooklyn	\$ 147
Glastonbury	\$ 407	East Windsor	\$ 308	Tolland	\$ 143
Putnam	\$ 406	Vernon	\$ 283	East Haddam	\$ 138
New Canaan	\$ 402	Griswold	\$ 279	Hebron	\$ 136
East Granby	\$ 400	Winchester	\$ 279	Andover	\$ 135
Ellington	\$ 399	North Branford	\$ 270	Salem	\$ 131

Table 3**Unfunded OPEB Liability Per Capita**

TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED OPEB LIABILITY PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED OPEB LIABILITY PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	UNFUNDED OPEB LIABILITY PER CAPITA
New Fairfield	\$ 129	Killingworth	\$ 24	Norfolk	\$ 0
Beacon Falls	\$ 115	Burlington	\$ 11	North Canaan	\$ 0
Chaplin	\$ 114	Canton	\$ 10	Old Lyme	\$ 0
Roxbury	\$ 112	Durham	\$ 4	Salisbury	\$ 0
Montville	\$ 97	Barkhamsted	\$ 0	Sharon	\$ 0
Canaan	\$ 96	Bethlehem	\$ 0	Shelton	\$ 0
Preston	\$ 94	Bridgewater	\$ 0	Sherman	\$ 0
Columbia	\$ 90	Cornwall	\$ 0	Southbury	\$ 0
Sprague	\$ 89	Goshen	\$ 0	Union	\$ 0
Marlborough	\$ 72	Haddam	\$ 0	Voluntown	\$ 0
Mansfield	\$ 69	Hartland	\$ 0	Warren	\$ 0
Eastford	\$ 67	Harwinton	\$ 0	Washington	\$ 0
Litchfield	\$ 61	Kent	\$ 0	Weston	\$ 0
Scotland	\$ 60	Lyme	\$ 0	Wilton	\$ 0
Deep River	\$ 51	Middlefield	\$ 0	Windsor Locks	\$ 0
Chester	\$ 44	Morris	\$ 0		
Woodstock	\$ 32	New Hartford	\$ 0		

Table 4**Total Long-Term Debt Per Capita**

TOWN/CITY	TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT PER CAPITA
Hamden	\$ 20,769	Westport	\$ 7,704	Rocky Hill	\$ 5,987
New Haven	\$ 18,897	Meriden	\$ 7,606	Bethel	\$ 5,584
Waterbury	\$ 17,831	Danbury	\$ 7,455	Norwalk	\$ 5,570
Bridgeport	\$ 17,529	East Haven	\$ 7,268	Derby	\$ 5,533
Stratford	\$ 14,446	Torrington	\$ 7,111	Woodbridge	\$ 5,405
Milford	\$ 13,540	New London	\$ 7,032	East Hampton	\$ 5,280
Hartford	\$ 13,523	Waterford	\$ 6,914	Wolcott	\$ 5,122
Naugatuck	\$ 11,506	Trumbull	\$ 6,854	Southington	\$ 5,114
Manchester	\$ 11,118	Clinton	\$ 6,754	Wilton	\$ 5,108
West Hartford	\$ 11,042	Thomaston	\$ 6,747	East Lyme	\$ 5,003
Middletown	\$ 10,265	Cheshire	\$ 6,656	Berlin	\$ 4,960
Bloomfield	\$ 9,904	Fairfield	\$ 6,618	Ansonia	\$ 4,958
North Haven	\$ 9,676	Greenwich	\$ 6,570	Putnam	\$ 4,838
East Hartford	\$ 9,193	Norwich	\$ 6,486	Stonington	\$ 4,739
Stamford	\$ 9,074	Orange	\$ 6,413	Plymouth	\$ 4,669
West Haven	\$ 8,925	Farmington	\$ 6,389	Redding	\$ 4,635
Seymour	\$ 8,100	Windsor	\$ 6,332	Franklin	\$ 4,569
Guilford	\$ 8,021	Old Saybrook	\$ 6,239	Wethersfield	\$ 4,534
New Britain	\$ 7,975	North Stonington	\$ 6,136	South Windsor	\$ 4,499
Watertown	\$ 7,715	New Canaan	\$ 6,000	Pomfret	\$ 4,456

Table 4**Total Long-Term Debt Per Capita**

TOWN / CITY	TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT PER CAPITA	TOWN / CITY	TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT PER CAPITA	TOWN / CITY	TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT PER CAPITA
Wallingford	\$ 4,373	Tolland	\$ 3,634	Granby	\$ 2,428
Darien	\$ 4,326	Portland	\$ 3,508	Colchester	\$ 2,409
Madison	\$ 4,264	Bristol	\$ 3,407	Killingly	\$ 2,390
Avon	\$ 4,249	North Branford	\$ 3,318	Essex	\$ 2,375
Glastonbury	\$ 4,243	Plainville	\$ 3,298	Canton	\$ 2,310
Enfield	\$ 4,142	Newington	\$ 3,250	Bozrah	\$ 2,303
Weston	\$ 4,017	New Milford	\$ 3,199	Griswold	\$ 2,290
Newtown	\$ 3,998	East Haddam	\$ 3,072	Woodbury	\$ 2,275
Ledyard	\$ 3,972	Sprague	\$ 2,995	New Fairfield	\$ 2,238
Middlebury	\$ 3,962	Coventry	\$ 2,973	Canaan	\$ 2,206
Brookfield	\$ 3,961	Westbrook	\$ 2,947	Preston	\$ 2,179
Groton	\$ 3,952	Easton	\$ 2,862	Suffield	\$ 2,119
Stafford	\$ 3,899	Bethany	\$ 2,854	East Windsor	\$ 2,085
Oxford	\$ 3,883	Simsbury	\$ 2,841	Ellington	\$ 2,047
Branford	\$ 3,858	Salisbury	\$ 2,820	Beacon Falls	\$ 1,952
Windsor Locks	\$ 3,795	Cromwell	\$ 2,695	Windham	\$ 1,949
Ridgefield	\$ 3,759	Montville	\$ 2,659	Deep River	\$ 1,861
Litchfield	\$ 3,741	Union	\$ 2,624	Haddam	\$ 1,793
Vernon	\$ 3,734	Bolton	\$ 2,521	Marlborough	\$ 1,731
Monroe	\$ 3,719	Sharon	\$ 2,479	Sterling	\$ 1,643

Table 4**Total Long-Term Debt Per Capita**

TOWN/CITY	TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT PER CAPITA	TOWN/CITY	TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT PER CAPITA
Plainfield	\$ 1,599	Andover	\$ 805	Middlefield	\$ 385
Winchester	\$ 1,565	Brooklyn	\$ 785	Old Lyme	\$ 350
Thompson	\$ 1,518	Woodstock	\$ 777	Hampton	\$ 337
New Hartford	\$ 1,492	Prospect	\$ 770	Washington	\$ 321
Warren	\$ 1,416	Willington	\$ 756	Roxbury	\$ 277
Lebanon	\$ 1,392	Lyme	\$ 753	Voluntown	\$ 274
Somers	\$ 1,344	Burlington	\$ 744	Chaplin	\$ 260
Sherman	\$ 1,330	Kent	\$ 682	North Canaan	\$ 230
Scotland	\$ 1,297	Hebron	\$ 632	Colebrook	\$ 176
Shelton	\$ 1,276	Killingworth	\$ 606	Columbia	\$ 175
East Granby	\$ 1,158	Canterbury	\$ 580	Harwinton	\$ 100
Cornwall	\$ 1,140	Southbury	\$ 505	Hartland	\$ 72
Mansfield	\$ 1,133	Barkhamsted	\$ 488	Eastford	\$ 67
Salem	\$ 931	Ashford	\$ 475	Goshen	\$ 38
Lisbon	\$ 861	Morris	\$ 441	Bridgewater	\$ 27
Bethlehem	\$ 853	Chester	\$ 397		
Norfolk	\$ 824	Durham	\$ 393		

It Could be Worse

The unfunded pension and OPEB liabilities faced by Connecticut towns and cities reflect a series of assumptions about future costs, and as such do not necessarily reflect the actual amount that will be paid out in the future. More generous assumptions about investment returns, for one thing, make near-term costs appear smaller.

The Connecticut General Assembly, strapped for cash and looking to avoid imposing a personal income tax, slashed its contribution to state pension funds in 1989 and 1990 by assuming investments would grow as much as 9.5 percent per year.^{xxiv} (The S&P 500 index averaged less than 6 percent annual growth in the five years that followed).

There are reasons to believe the actual liabilities are still higher than what was reported in the fiscal 2020 financial statements.

First, municipalities are not subject to any state rules about how they expect investments to perform or how they value their future liabilities. Instead, local officials and their actuaries practice discretion when it comes to certain assumptions used in valuation processes.

The City of Middletown's most recent valuation, for instance, found assets exceeded liabilities by nearly \$34 million, and as a result, the city reported no unfunded pension liability. To be sure, this reflects years of

city leaders ensuring adequate contributions to their pension fund. The city, however, assumes a 7 percent rate of return. If the city were to use a more conservative 6 percent discount rate its balance sheet would carry a \$21 million liability.

Connecticut's main state pension funds assume 6.9 percent returns, while neighboring New York assumes 5.9 percent returns for its state and local employee system.^{xxv}

The valuation of long-term liabilities allows for unconventional accounting moves, such as the City of Hartford transferring ownership of a park in 2017 to its municipal pension fund.^{xxvi}

Thirty-three of the state's municipalities report in their audited financial statements that they have no OPEB liabilities (funded or otherwise). This list includes the City of Shelton, where past union labor contracts have made explicit mention of municipal payments toward healthcare in retirement.

The cost of promised benefits continues growing each year as municipal officials make more promises to more employees. Some employees hired today can be expected to collect benefits for a longer than they will be on the job. And of those, some will inevitably be collecting benefits until the end of the century, despite having stopped working before 2050.

Recommendations

Connecticut's experience with guaranteeing future benefits constitutes an unheeded warning. State government itself, for one thing, continues enrolling new employees in defined-benefit pension plans.

With respect to municipalities, the General Assembly should take the following steps to ensure taxpayers have a realistic view of what they're expected to pay in coming years.

Require more frequent actuarial valuations and limit assumptions.

State law requires municipalities to have an actuary calculate its OPEB and pension liabilities at least once every five years. By comparison, the state re-evaluates its pension liabilities annually. The General Assembly should update the law to require valuations at least every three years using a tiered system, with the largest systems (gross liabilities over \$100 million) undergoing annual valuations.

Given that a municipal debt crisis would ultimately become the General Assembly's problem, municipalities should not be making more optimistic assumptions about investment returns.

The State Employees Retirement Commission uses a 6.9 percent assumed rate of return in pension obligation valuations. The General Assembly should, at the very least, bar municipalities from making more optimistic assumptions about their own investments. With New York's systems already assuming returns below 6 percent, the General Assembly should consider limiting both state and municipal pension systems to assumed rates of return at or below 6.5 percent.

Restore local legislative control over pension benefits and retiree healthcare.

Pension rules and retiree healthcare benefit levels should be set by law, not negotiable benefits.

New York since 1973 has prohibited negotiating retirement benefits under the state's public-sector collective bargaining law.^{xxvii} The Empire State's practice of setting pension rules in the State Legislature rather than in closed-door negotiations is a major factor behind the state's public pension systems being among the country's best-funded.

This reform would allow local governments to immediately place future employees in defined-contribution plans without first having to seek a labor union's blessing.

Improve transparency for municipal financial records.

The state's Freedom of Information Act should be amended to require municipalities to post all audited financial reports and actuarial reports on their websites within two weeks of their receipt for residents to inspect.

To make data in audited financial reports more accessible, the state should establish a standard for machine-readable disclosure based on eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL). The XBRL standard is used for public company financial reporting and is being applied to municipal financial reporting in Florida.

Methodology Notes

Branford, Derby, Ansonia, Windham and Andover statistics reflect FY2019 CAFRs. Home price data uses the Zillow home value index (ZHVI).

Employment data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS).

The state's nine taxing boroughs are not included in the rankings. Their fiscal health scores were as follows:

BOROUGH	SCORE			
Groton	71		Woodmont	92
Danielson	76		Litchfield	48
Jewett City	80		Stonington	70
Newtown	89		Bantam	90
			Fenwick	80

Endnotes

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ⁱⁱ "Treasurer Wooden, For Only The Second Time In History, Transfers Estimated \$1.623 Billion Budget Reserve Fund Excess To Pay Down Long-term Pension Liabilities," Press release, Office of the State Comptroller, 27 Sep 2021. portal.ct.gov/-/media/OTT/Press-Room/Press-Releases/2021/PR092721TreasurerWooden-Transfers-1623-Billion-Reserve-Fund-Excess-to-Pension-Liabilities.pdf

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^v "Mayors Harp, Ganim Scrutinize State's Half-Billion Dollar Hartford Bailout," Press release. 23 Mar 18. newhavenct.gov/news/displaynews.htm?NewsID=456&TargetID=67

^{vi} CT Office of the State Comptroller, Open Checkbook

^{vii} National Compensation Survey, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

^{viii} "Municipal Fiscal Indicators, Fiscal Years Ended 2015 to 2019," State of Connecticut, Office of Policy & Management, April 2021

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- ^{xxi} Judson, George. “U.S. Judge Blocks Bridgeport From Bankruptcy Court.” *New York Times*, 2 Aug 91.
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